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Abstract—In peer-to-peer file sharing network, it is hard
to distinguish between a legitimate newcomer and a white-
washer. This makes whitewashing a big problem in peer-
to-peer networks. Although the problem of whitewashing
can be solved using permanent identities, it may take away
the right of anonymity for users. In this paper, we a have
proposed a novel algorithm to avoid this problem when
network uses free temporary identities. In this algorithm,
the initial reputation is adjusted according to the level of
whitewashing in the network.
I. Introduction
With the tremendous growth in the number of Internet
users, the traditional client-server systems are proved to
be less scalable. This is because load on a server increases
with the increase in the number of clients. The clients or
user machines have become more powerful in the recent
past. These two things pushed the evolution of peer-
to-peer computing. Peer-to-peer computing is a type of
computing where a peer or user machines act as server
as well as client. There is no central control or authority
in the network. All peers are equal in status. Peer-to-peer
networks are typically used for resource sharing within
the network. Resource may be storage, processing power
or some kind of file.
Distributed nature of peer-to-peer networks poses
many challenges. While designing protocols for peers,
systems designers usually assume that peers in the
network are simple machines and peers will not play
games by modifying the protocols i.e., every peer will
behave in selfless and hence co-operative manner.
But nodes are the entities operated by rational human
beings. So nodes are expected to behave in a selfish
manner i.e. they try to maximise their utility. This results
in their non co-operative behaviour. This phenomenon is
explained by famous Prisoners’ Dilemma, in which Nash
Equilibrium (NE) is achieved when both prisoners de-
ceive each other [1]. Similarly in a file sharing network, if
peers are considered as players, their NE happens when
none of them share the resources [2]. Tendency of nodes
to draw resources from the network and not giving any
thing in return is termed as ’Free Riding’.
Experimental studies on Gnutella network, first in
2000 [3], second [4] in 2002 states that more than half
the number of total files shared in the network are from
just 7% or less number of peers where as 25% or more
number of peers share no file. Third study in 2005 [5]
also confirmed this fact by showing that number of free
rider nodes is as high as 85%.
Different incentive or disincentive mechanisms are
generally used to avid free riding. In these mechanisms,
incentive is given to a peer if it co-operate and disincen-
tive is given if it does not co-operates. This incentive is
generally better quality of service or resource allocation.
A reputation management system is required to man-
age these incentives and disincentives. As peer-to-peer
networks are totally decentralised systems, we need a
distributed reputation management system. Such kind
of reputation management systems has been suggested
by the authors in [6].
When these mechanisms are implemented, selfish
users start whitewashing and colluding [7]. When a
node has bad reputation in the network then to avoid
disincentives, it leaves the network and returns back
with a new identity as a new comer to the network.
This is termed as whitewashing. Whitewashing problem
becomes more challenging as it is difficult to differentiate
between a legitimate newcomer and a whitewasher.
In this paper we analyses the pay-off and penalty for
cooperative and defector node respectively in a reputa-
tion management system. We also propose an adaptive
algorithm to counter the whitewashing attack.
Remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Sec-
tion II discusses the related work. Section III describes
the system model. Section IV computes the pay-off
in the reputation game. In section V, the problem of
whitewashing is discussed along with an algorithm as
its solution and its analysis, Section VI presents the
numerical results and section VII concludes the paper.
II. RelatedWork
Many authors have suggested that whitewashing can
be totally removed if system has permanent identities
[8], [9]. Problem of whitewashing due to availability
of cheap or free identities was initially pointed out by
Friedaman et.al. [10]. They proved that considering every
newcomer as defector is a better policy than any other
2static stranger policy. Whereas Feldman et.al. [11] proved
that newcomers should only be punished if turnover
rate is high. They also proved that a legitimate user can
only win from a whitewashing user if newcomer will
be served well with a very small probability [12]. Yang
et.al. studied Maze file sharing system and concluded
that incentives promote whitewashing [13].
Lai et.al. suggested in [11], [14] that newcomers should
be served as per the behaviour shown by them at that
time. But this is more prone to collusion and more-
over in a resource sharing network, nodes generally
form a group where they serve more. In that case
observing behaviour will not work well. Similar kind
of approaches are proposed for new service providers’
reputation among consumers in on-line communities
[15].
Anceaume et.al. [16] have suggested to charge an
entry fee from every newcomer in such a way that it
should avoid whitewashing and should not discourage
newcomers. Chen et.al. claims that a whitewashing node
will continue to have same kind of habits even after
whitewash so it should be identified and punished on
the basis of its habits [17]. Zuo et.al. suggested that new-
comers should only be allowed to access the resource
from newcomers and low trust value nodes [18].
Yu et.al. [19] proposed that any user that have served
even once should have a higher value of reputation then
a newcomer and it should rise faster initially and slower
later on as a result of cooperation.
III. SystemModel
In this paper, we are studying a pure unstructured
peer-to-peer network. Peers in this network are con-
nected by an access link followed by a backbone link
and then again by an access link to the second node.
We are assuming that the network is heavily loaded i.e.
every peer has sufficient number of pending download
requests, hence these peers are contending for the avail-
able transmission capacity. We also assume that every
peer is paying the cost of access link as per the usage.
So, every peer wants to maximises its download and
minimise its upload so that it can get maximum utility
for its money spend in access link.
Considering nodes to be purely rational does not
answer many questions about nodes’ behaviour [11].
Feldman et.al. [11] proposed a model where rationality
depend upon the type of node or the level of generosity
i.e. every node will free ride or contribute as per its type.
On the similar lines, we propose the level of honesty
regarding whitewashing behaviour of nodes. If hi be the
honesty level of ith node then i will whitewash provided,
Rini ≥ hi (1)
Here Rini is the initial reputation given to a newcomer
node. It means that every node is a potential white
washer as per its level of honesty. If pay-off by white-
wash is greater than its honesty level, then it will
whitewash otherwise it will remain an honest node.
As network will contain all kind of nodes with equal
probability, honesty level of nodes are assumed to be
distributed uniformly between 0 to 1.
Reputation can be measured in number of ways. We
measure the reputation of a node after a transaction as,
Reputation o f node i =
Resource provided by node i
Resource requestd to node i
. (2)
IV. Pay-off in Reputation Game
In this section, we will see the pay-off of an agent in
a network where a reputation management system has
been implemented with different type of identities viz.
permanent identities and temporary identities. Perma-
nent identities can also be termed as ∞ cost identities
as these can not be changed. Social security number in
USA is one such example. Whereas temporary identities
can be classified into two types, finite cost identities and
zero cost identities on the basis of cost of assigning a
new identity.
Here it is important to note that in an interaction
even if cost incurred in serving other nodes’ request and
the value received from other nodes in response to its
request, are same, the node still gains by a small amount
δ. This comes because after every transaction the chance
of survival satisfaction for a node increases.
A. Pay-off of agents with permanent identities
Let us assume that there are N nodes in the network.
Reputation of these nodes is distributed between 0 and 1
with some arbitrary distribution having mean µ. When
a new node joins the network, it is assigned an initial
reputation value of Rini. We are assuming that reputation
aggregation is happening after every round of transac-
tions and in this process, the nodes that have transacted
with the node will jointly form a reputation that will
be spread across the network. It means that every node
knows the reputation of other node after every round.
For simplicity we assume that every node requests for
same amount of resource i.e. c. We also assume that
network is large and hence the mean reputation of the
network will not change considerably and probability of
allocation against a node’s request will be
P(allocation) ∝ (reputation)x
Taking proportionality constant to be 1 for simplicity
P(allocation) = (reputation)x. (3)
As we have stated, the expected reputation of nodes will
be µ. Any node can ask for a resource from the entering
node. The probability that a particular node will ask for
a resource is 1N assuming that all nodes are equally likely
to ask for a resource. Let us assume that every node can
3ask c amount of resource. So, if the node receives one
request, the expected service, it has to do, will be
E[Serv(1)] =
1
N
· µx · c +
1
N
· µx · c + ... +
1
N
· µx · c
= µx · c. (4)
Whereas the node will get service according to its repu-
tation. So the expected return for this node if it makes a
single request will be
E[ret(1)] = c · (Rini)
x + δ. (5)
First we will see the pay-off of cooperative node. If
a node serves m requests and makes m´ requests, the
expected pay-off of this node at the end of the first round
will be
Ec[payo f f (1)] = −mµ
x · c + m´c · (Rini)
x + δ. (6)
The expected reputation of an entering node after first
round of transaction, if reputation is measured using
equation (2), is
Ec[R(1)] =
mµx · c
mc
,
= µx. (7)
The reputation of a node i is estimated by few other
nodes. The nodes with whom interaction does not take
place use Rini as the default reputation. When aggregat-
ing the reputation [6], only the estimated reputations are
aggregated, not the default value Rini.
Similarly pay-off and reputation of this node at the
end of second round will be,
Ec[payo f f (2)] = −2mµ
x · c + m´ · (µx)x · c
+m´ · (Rini)
xc + 2δ
Ec[R(2)] =
µx + µx
2
= µx
Similarly, pay-off and reputation of this node at the end
of kth round will be
Ec[payo f f (k)] = −kmµ
x · c + (k − 1)m´ · (µx)x · c (8)
+m´ · (Rini)
xc + kδ
Ec[R(k)] =
µx + ... + µx
k
= µx (9)
Now let’s consider defecting node. In the first round it
will get service as per Rini. But after that, it will not get
any service because every body will know that the node
with this identity is not going to serve. It can not change
its permanent identity as this will cost him ∞. So the
expected pay-off of defecting node, with same request
profile, after k rounds will be
Ed[payo f f (k)] = m´ · (Rini)
xc + δ. (10)
If we take m = m´, as this should be the condition sta-
tistically, it can be seen that for x ≥ 1, cooperative node
will always remain in negative pay-off if it has a Rini less
then µ. Moreover for any value of Rini with x ≥ 1, the
defector node will always remain in advantage. So value
of x should be less then 1. Now let’s compare (8) and
(10) to get the number of rounds required after which
cooperative node will be in advantage over defector
node.
m´ · (Rini)
xc+δ ≤ −kmµx ·c+ (k−1)m´ · (µx)x ·c+m´ · (Rini)
xc+kδ
On solving, we get
k ≥
m´(µx)x + kδc
m´(µx)x + kδc −mµ
x
. (11)
Considering δ to be small and minimizing the value of
k with respect to x, it turns out that for x = 12 , k will be
minimum. So for x = 12 , k will be
k ≥
m´µ
1
4
m´µ
1
4 −mµ
1
2
(12)
Here it is interesting to note that m´ = m (that should be
the condition under equilibrium) and µ = 1 value of k
turns out to be ∞. This happens because now newcomer
node can not improve its reputation any more above µ =
1 and if node is cooperative, every time its positive pay-
off becomes equal to its negative pay-off. Only δ gain
is the gain that comes as an advantage to him over the
defector. Secondly if every body has reputation equal to
1 that means it’s an ideal system and does not need any
reputation management.
B. Pay-off of agents with zero cost identities
In case of free identities, the pay-off for a cooperative
node will remain same as in the case of permanent
identities i.e. (8). But for defector node, it will change
because now defector node can white wash and change
its identity. So the defector’s expected pay-off after first
round will be,
Ew[payo f f (1)] = m´ · c · (Rini)
x + δ.
Its reputation will become 0 as it will not serve but it will
change its identity as it will not cost any thing for it. So
its reputation will again become Rini. Pay-off of defector
after second round will be,
Ew[payo f f (2)] = m´ · c · (Rini)
x + δ + m´ · c · (Rini)
x + δ
= 2m´ · c · (Rini)
x + 2δ.
Similarly pay-off after k rounds will be,
Ew[payo f f (k)] = km´ · c · (Rini)
x + kδ. (13)
Comparing (8) and (13) to get the number of rounds
required after which cooperative node will be on ad-
vantage over defector node.
km´·(Rini)
xc+kδ ≤ −kmµx ·c+(k−1)m´·(µx)x ·c+m´·(Rini)
xc+kδ
On solving we get,
k ≥
m´(µx)x − m´(Rini)
x
m´(µx)x −mµx − m´(Rini)x
. (14)
4Fig. 1. Variation in Initial reputation, number of round and x
For µ = 0.5 and m = m´, it turns out that the maximum
possible value of Rini giving which ensures that a coop-
erative node will win against a defector node is 0.036 at
x = 0.70 (figure 1).
C. Pay-off of agents with finite cost identities
Now we will consider an intermediate case where
identities have a fixed finite cost, i.e. z. It means that
every time when a node will enter in the network with
a new identity, it will get a pay-off of −z. The expected
pay-off of the cooperative node in the end of first round
will be
Ec[payo f f (1)] = −mµ
x · c + m´c · (Rini)
x − z + δ. (15)
The expected reputation of entering node after first
round of transaction if reputation is measured using
equation (2), is given by
Ec[R(1)] =
mµx · c
mc
= µx. (16)
Similarly pay-off and reputation of this node at the end
of second round will be
Ec[payo f f (2)] = −2mµ
x · c + m´ · (µx)x · c
+m´ · (Rini)
xc − z + 2δ
Ec[R(2)] =
ux + µx
2
= µx
Similarly pay-off and reputation of this node at the end
of kth round will be,
Ec[payo f f (k)] = −kmµ
x · c + (k − 1)m´ · (µx)x · c (17)
+m´ · (Rini)
xc − z + kδ
Ec[R(k)] =
µx + ... + µx
k
= µx. (18)
The defector’s expected pay-off after first round will be,
Ew[payo f f (1)] = m´ · c · (Rini)
x − z + δ.
Its reputation will become 0 as it will not serve but it will
change its identity as it will not cost any thing for it. So
its reputation will again become Rini. Pay-off of defector
after second round will be,
Ew[payo f f (2)] = m´ · c · (Rini)
x − z + m´ · c · (Rini)
x − z + 2δ
= 2m´ · c · (Rini)
x − 2z + 2δ.
Similarly pay-off after k rounds will be,
Ew[payo f f (k)] = km´ · c · (Rini)
x − kz + kδ. (19)
Comparing (17) and (19) to get the number of rounds
required after which cooperative node will be on ad-
vantage over defector node, we get
km´·c·(Rini)
x−kz+kδ ≤ kmµx·c+(k−1)m´·(µx)x·c+m´·(Rini)
xc−z+kδ.
(20)
k ≥
m´(µx)x − m´(Rini)
x + zc
m´(µx)x −mµx − m´(Rini)x +
z
c
. (21)
V. Problem ofWhitewashing
When in a peer-to-peer network, a reputation manage-
ment system is implemented, selfish nodes start apply-
ing different strategies to counter the rules of the system
for their benefit. Whitewashing is one such strategy.
If cheap identities are available in the system, a ra-
tional node does not cooperate i.e. it free rides and
changes its identity when its reputation goes low. When
a normal node encounters such node, it thinks that this
is a legitimate newcomer and hence serves it according
to that. Hence, a white washer utilizes the resources of
system even without cooperating.
Whitewashing can be totally avoided if we have per-
manent identities as mentioned in the previous section.
But having such permanent identities implies that no-
body is anonymous [10]. One way to get permanent
identities without losing anonymity is to use Gossip-
Based Computation of Aggregate Information. This re-
quires a trusted central certification authority and every
user has to take a signed certificate.
If permanent identities are not to be used, there is no
way by which one can differentiate between legitimate
newcomer and a whitewasher. Whitewashing can be
avoided by keeping a low initial reputation value Rini.
But as we have seen in the previous section, this leads
to a very small value and discourages legitimate new
comers to join the system because of initial hardship in
the system.
Keeping some cost of identities seems to be a good
idea. But it is difficult to decide the cost of an iden-
tity. If the cost is kept higher, the whitewashing will
be discouraged but on the other hand legitimate new
comers will also be discouraged. This will reduce the
efficiency of the system. Moreover, distribution of the
earning due to the cost of identities among the existing
5users, will be another problem. Alternatively a policy
may be made that any newcomer will not be served
initially or will be served with poor quality of service.
It will be served properly only once it has earned some
credit by serving some existing nodes i.e. a newcomer
will be provided small or 0 initial reputation. This will
lead to initial hardship to legitimate newcomers and
hence will decrease system performance.
We propose that when a new node joins the network,
it should be given an initial reputation value Rini. As
it’s difficult to identify whether a new joining node is
a a whitewasher or legitimate newcomer, all we can do
is to make decision on the basis of level of whitewash
in the network. So this initial value should keep on
changing on the basis of level of whitewashing in the
network. It means that if whitewashing level is low, the
Rini value will be kept high; where as if whitewashing
level increases, Rini value will be decreased adaptively.
As whitewashing nodes can not be identified and
hence can not be counted so we need to estimate the
level of whitewashing on the basis of growth in network
at regular basis. For this, we need to follow an algorithm
for estimation of whitewashing level. In this algorithm,
we count the number of nodes at regular basis and finds
the increase in the size of network in distributed fashion.
This can be easily done using gossiping techniques. If
reputation management system is based on [6], gossiping
is already happening at regular intervals. So there will
not be any additional overhead.
As we are considering network based on PA model
[20], the newcomer node will join the network preferably
attaching to the existing nodes with high degree. Hence,
growth rate at different places within the network will
be different.
Once a node finds the total number of nodes in the
network at two consecutive gossiping instances, it can
locally calculate the overall growth rate of network. This
estimate of growth rate must be adjusted to get an esti-
mate of local growth rate due to the reason mentioned
above. This can be done using,
Glocal,i =
dlocal,i
daverage
·
Nn
Nn−1
. (22)
Here Glocal,i is local growth rate of the network with re-
spect to node i; daverage is the average degree of complete
network; dlocal,i is the local average degree with respect to
node i; and Nn, Nn−1 are the network size in current and
previous iteration respectively. Overall average degree of
the network can be found out using gossip. By adding
one more parameter, i.e. self degree of node, to gossiping
will give the sum of degrees of nodes in the network and
hence average degree can be estimated by every node.
As gossip is already happening, adding new parameter
in the gossip will not lead to too much increase in
overhead. The local average degree can be computed by
taking average of neighbours’ degree.
The nodes will also monitor see the recently departed
nodes. It will categorize theses into two types on the
basis of Expected initial reputation. Expected initial rep-
utation is the average of maximum initial reputation and
minimum initial reputation. First type of nodes have
higher or equal reputation than the expected initial rep-
utation. These nodes will be considered as legitimate de-
parting nodes as no node will whitewash if it already has
a reputation higher than the expected initial reputation.
Second type of nodes are with lower reputation then the
expected initial reputation. These will be considered as
potential whitewasher nodes. A node shares following
information about its neighbourhood - number of nodes
at the end of previous iteration, number of departing
nodes and newly arriving nodes since last iteration. If
there is no whitewashing, then newly arriving nodes (Ai)
should be equal to sum of legitimate departing nodes (Li)
and expected localized growth, i.e.,
Ai = Li +Ni,n−1 · (Glocal,i − 1).
If whitewashing happens, then
Ai > Li +Ni,n−1 · (Glocal,i − 1).
The difference is expected to b number of whitewashers
w´i. Thus
Ai − w´i = Li +Ni,n−1 · (Glocal,i − 1).
We can define the level of whitewashing Wi,n by node i
as
Wi,n =
∑
j∈Neg(i)
A j −N j,n−1 · (Glocal, j − 1) − L j
∑
j∈Neg(i)
N j,n
. (23)
In this formula, Ni,n is the sum of degree of the neigh-
bours of a node at the current iteration and Neg(i) is the
set of neighbours of node i.
We assume that node will vary the value of initial
reputation with respect to level of whitewashing in
quadratic fashion. Let Rini,i,max, Rini,i,n and Rini,i,min be the
initial reputation values at zero whitewashing, current
whitewashing level (Wi,n) and maximum possible white-
washing level at node i respectively. We propose the
initial reputation Rini,i,n as,
Rini,i,n =

R˜ini,i,n if R˜ini,i,n ≥ Rini,i,min.
Rini,i,min, otherwise.
(24)
where
R˜ini,i,n =
(
1 −
Wi,n
Wi,max
)2
· Rini,i,max
The Wi,max is the maximum possible whitewashing level
at the node i. Initially it will be taken as the ratio of
number of nodes that have honesty level between 0
and Rini,n,max and total nodes. Hence, it turns out to be
(Rini,n,max · N)/N = Rini,n,max. Later on node will try to
estimate it by taking the maximum whitewashing level
seen over last n´ rounds such that
Wi,max = max
last n´ rounds
Wi,n. (25)
6The value of n´may be dynamically adjusted by the node
as per the change observed in whitewashing level. For
this paper, n´ has been taken as constant for every node
for simplicity. The value of this constant has been taken
as 10 for simulation
The value of Rini,i,min will be taken such that a cooper-
ative users may win over whitewashing users after few
rounds. As evident from the figure 1, number of rounds
required to win a cooperative user increases at a very
high rate above a certain Rini,i value. It may be taken as
Rini,i,min.
The value of Rini,i,max will be decided on the basis of
the cooperation received from legitimate newcomers. A
node will average the reputations of newcomers nodes
after every gossiping round. In this average computa-
tion, it will consider the nodes that have seen three
gossiping rounds. This average may be taken as Rini,i,max.
Timing diagram of whole process that a node will
undergo is described in figure 2. We can observe the
following from this figure. Any node will periodically
allocate resource to the requesting nodes. In this process,
a node will first reply to the received queries, then on the
basis of number of queries received and network growth
rate, it will estimate the level of whitewashing. After this
estimation, node will allocate resources to the requesting
nodes. The new nodes that will join the network after
whitewash level estimation will be served resources after
the next whitewash level estimate. Nodes can estimate
the growth rate by interpolating the previous gossips
until the next round of gossip is completed.
A. Analysis of Algorithm
While analysing the algorithm, we need to understand
that a node has two choices, first, to be cooperative
and the second to be non-cooperative. While being non-
cooperative, a node have the choice to whitewash to
maximize his gain. Usually non cooperative users will
whitewash as that is the only way it can gain from
the system. A user will be non-cooperative and hence
will also whitewash if its honesty level is lesser than
the current initial reputation allotted to any newcomer
node. As the current initial reputation level will always
lie in between the maximum initial reputation Rini,i,max
and minimum initial reputation Rini,i,min, we can state
the following. All nodes having honesty level higher
then Rini,i,max, will never whitewash and thus will be
always be cooperative. All nodes having honesty level
lesser than Rini,i,min will always whitewash. All the nodes
having honesty level between Rini,i,max and Rini,i,min will
choose to be either cooperative or non cooperative (thus
be whitewasher) depending on expected current value
of initial reputation.
If in the system, the current value of initial reputation
is maintained such that the nodes who are whitewashing
in every round will certainly loose to cooperative nodes,
the nodes will have no choice but to be cooperative.
The nodes who choose to be non-cooperative, have
a choice of whitewashing or not. In case whitewashing
B
Do whitewash Don’t whitewash
A Do whitewash (Rini,i,min, Rini,i,min) (R´, 0)
Don’t whitewash (0, R´) (0, 0)
TABLE I
Payoff of a whitewasher - pure strategy
nodes are less, the whitewashing level will be less and
thus Rini,i,n will be set to higher value and vice-versa. Let
us understand, what should be natural choice of non-
cooperative node - to whitewash or not to whitewash.
To understand the process that is happening with the
nodes, we will start with the simple case when only two
players have their honesty level below the maximum
initial reputation and above the minimum initial repu-
tation. There are three possibilities in this case. First, no
node whitewashes, second, one of the nodes whitewash
and third when both nodes whitewash. Here, the maxi-
mum whitewash level is 2N . Hence, in first case Rini,i,n will
be Rini,i,max, in second case, it will be
Rini,i,max
4 and in third
case, it will be Rini,i,min according to (24). Therefore the
game matrix will be as follows, Here R´ =
Rini,i,max
4 . By this
matrix, it is evident that {Do whitewash, Do whitewash}
is the weakly dominant strategy and hence both players
will enter in every round and will get a payoff of Rini,i,min.
Rini,i,min is a payoff that is too low to whitewash as ex-
plained earlier, hence it remains no more lucrative option
for such users. Consequently they do not whitewash and
their payoff becomes zero.
This zero payoff discourages their non-cooperative,
whitewashing tendency and consequently forces them
for cooperation. Similar thing will occur in κ player
game, i.e. when κ players have their honesty level
below the maximum initial reputation. In that case,
game will be as follows.
Player set P={nodes with honesty level below maximum
initial reputation}
Actions∈{S1, S2, ..., Sκ}
here Si={Do whitewash, Don’t whitewash}
∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3, ..., κ}
Payo f f = ui((v1, ..., vκ))
=
1 −
∑
j
v j
κ

2
· Rini,n,maxif Rini,i,n ≥ hi.
Nodes will not whitewash if Rini,n < hi. Here ui is the
pay-off of ith player and v j is the action performed by
jth player such that, v j = 1 if player do the whitewash
and 0 otherwise. In this case also, it is evident that
the weakly dominant strategy for all the players is to
whitewash. This leads to a payoff of Rini,i,min. As said
7Fig. 2. Timing Diagram
B
Round 1, (p) Round 2, (1-p)
A Round 1, (q) (0,0) (R´, R´)
Round 2, (1-q) (R´, R´) (0,0)
TABLE II
Payoff of a whitewasher - mixed strategy
earlier Rini,i,min is a payoff that is too low to whitewash
and it remains no more lucrative option for these users.
Consequently they do not whitewash and their payoff
becomes zero. This zero payoff discourages their non-
cooperative, whitewashing tendency and consequently
forces them for cooperation.
Users may also randomize their whitewashing action
in each period, i.e. they may whitewash in a period with
a particular probability. It is easy to observe that if there
are κ players then they will randomized over utmost κ
rounds to maximize their randomization benefit. Let’s
examine a two player case when both are randomizing
over two periods. The game matrix will be as follows.
Here, when both the players are whitewashing simulta-
neously, their payoff will become Rini,i,min and that will
become zero because of reason that both the nodes will
find whitewashing non-lucrative and will decide not to
whitewash. Let us compute the payoff for player A for
whitewashing in round 1 when player B is whitewashing
in round 1 and round 2 with probabilities p and 1 − p
respectively,
payo f f (A, 1) = p · 0 + (1 − p) · R´. (26)
Similarly for entering in round 2,
payo f f (A, 2) = (p) · R´ + (1 − p) · 0. (27)
As player A is randomizing, pay-off in both the round
should be same, so on equating both the equation we get
p = 12 and in similar fashion q =
1
2 . So the equilibrium
probability distribution for p and q both is { 12 ,
1
2 }.
Now let us examine a three player (A,B,C) case. There
are two possibilities – when players are randomizing
over two rounds and when players are randomizing for
three rounds. Let us assume that, the initial reputations
given in some round when 1, 2 or 3 players are entering
are R´1, R´2 and R´3 respectively such that R´1 > R´2 > R´3.
The exact values of R´1, R´2 and R´3 can be calculated using
(24),
R´1 =
(
1 −
1
3
)2
· Rini,i,max =
4
9
Rini,i,max (28a)
R´2 =
(
1 −
2
3
)2
· Rini,i,max =
1
9
Rini,i,max (28b)
R´3 =
(
1 −
3
3
)2
· Rini,i,max = Rini,i,min (28c)
As we know that players have different level of honesty,
we assume that A has highest level of honesty and will
only whitewash for R´1, B will whitewash for R´1 and R´2
and C will whitewash for all values of initial reputation.
Lets us first consider randomization over three rounds.
Probabilities for whitewashing in round 1, 2 and 3 are
pA, qA, rA; pB, qB, rB and pC, qC, rC for players A,B and C
respectively.
Equating the pay-off of player A for whitewashing in
round 1, 2 or 3,
(1 − pB)(1 − pC)R´1 = (1 − qB)(1 − qC)R´1 = (1 − rB)(1 − rC)R´1 (29)
Here it may be noted that player A will only whitewash
when neither B nor C are whitewashing. Similarly for
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(1 − pA)pCR´2 + (1 − pC)pAR´2 + (1 − pA)(1 − pC)R´1 =
(1 − qA)qCR´2 + (1 − qC)qAR´2 + (1 − qA)(1 − qC)R´1 =
(1 − rA)rCR´2 + (1 − rC)rAR´2 + (1 − rA)(1 − rC)R´1 (30)
Here it may be noted that player B will only whitewash
when only one more or no player is whitewashing. and
for player C
R´3pBpA + (1 − pB)pAR´2 + (1 − pA)pBR´2 +
(1 − pB)(1 − pA)R´1 = R´3qBqA + (1 − qB)qAR´2 +
(1 − qA)qBR´2 + (1 − qB)(1 − qA)R´1 = R´3rBrA +
(1 − rB)rAR´2 + (1 − rA)rBR´2 + (1 − rB)(1 − rA)R´1(31)
Here it may be noted that player C will whitewash in
all conditions. And
pA + qA + rA = pB + qB + rB = pC + qC + rC = 1 (32)
Solving above set of equations we get pA = pB = pC =
qA = qB = qC = rA = rB = rC =
1
3 . Hence, when
randomizing over 3 rounds,the payoff of player A will
be ( 49 R´1), for player B the payoff will be (
4
9 R´1 +
4
9 R´2),
and for player C the payoff will be ( 49 R´1 +
2
9 R´2 +
1
9 R´2).
Using equation (28), the value of payoff for A, B and C
will be ( 1681Rini,i,max), (
20
81Rini,i,max) and (
18
81Rini,i,max+
1
9Rini,i,min)
respectively.
Similarly if these three players will randomize over
two periods with probabilities pA, qA, pB, qB, pC, qC respec-
tively, the probabilities will turn out to be 12 . Hence,
when randomizing over 2 rounds, the payoff of player A
will be ( 14 R´1), for player B the payoff will be (
1
4 R´1 +
1
2 R´2)
and for player C the payoff will be ( 14 R´1 +
1
2 R´2 +
1
4 R´2).
Using equation (28), the value of payoff for A, B and C
will be ( 436Rini,i,max), (
6
36Rini,i,max) and (
6
36Rini,i,max+
1
4Rini,i,min)
respectively.
It is evident from payoffs shown above that players
will prefer to randomize over three rounds and not less
then three.
Now let us examine for κ players (A1,A2, ...,Aκ) ran-
domizing over κ´ rounds. Let us assume that, the initial
reputations given in some round when 1 to κ players
are entering are R´1 to R´κ respectively such that R´1 >
R´2 > ... > R´κ. The exact values of R´1, R´2 etc. can be
calculated using (24). As we know that players have
different level of honesty, we assume that A1 has highest
level of honesty and will only accept R´1, and Aκ will
accept all values of initial reputation.
Let us assume that probability for whitewashing in ith
round by A j is p ji. Equating the pay-off of player A1 for
entering in all κ´ rounds,
(1 − p21)(1 − p31)...(1 − pκ1) · R´1
= (1 − p22)(1 − p32)...(1 − pκ2) · R´1
= ... = (1 − p2κ´)(1 − p3κ´)...(1 − pκκ´) · R´1 (33)
Similarly for player A2
R´2 · [(p11)(1 − p31)...(1− pκ1) + (1 − p11)(p31)...(1− pκ1)
+... + (1 − p11)(1 − p31)...(pκ1)] + R´1 · (1 − p11)(1 − p31)
...(1 − pκ1)
= R´2 · [(p12)(1 − p32)...(1− pκ2) + (1 − p12)(p32)...(1− pκ2) + ... +
(1 − p12)(1 − p32)...(pκ2)] + R´1 · (1 − p12)(1 − p32)...(1− pκ2)
= ... = R´2 · [(p1κ´)(1 − p3κ´)...(1 − pκκ´) + (1 − p1κ´)(p3κ´)...(1− pκκ´)R´2
+... + (1 − p1κ´)(1 − p3κ´)...(pκκ´)] +
R´1 · (1 − p1κ´)(1 − p3κ´)...(1 − pκκ´) (34)
and for player Aκ
R´κ · (p11)(p21)...(p(κ−1)1) + ´Rκ−1 · [(1 − p11)(p21)...(p(κ−1)1) +
(p11)(1 − p21)...(p(κ−1)1) + (p11)(p21)...(1− p(κ−1)1)] + ... +
R´2 · [(p11)(1 − p21)...(1− p(κ−1)1) + (1 − p11)(p21)...
(1 − p(κ−1)1) + ... + (1 − p11)(1 − p21)...(p(κ−1)1)] +
R´1 · (1 − p11)(1 − p21)...(1 − p(κ−1)1)
= R´κ · (p12)(p22)...(p(κ−1)2) + ´Rκ−1 · [(1 − p12)(p22)...(p(κ−1)2)
+(p12)(1 − p22)...(p(κ−1)2) + (p12)(p22)...(1 − p(κ−1)2)]
+R´2 · [(p12)(1 − p22)...(1 − p(κ−1)2) + (1 − p12)(p22)...(1− p(κ−1)2)
+... + (1 − p12)(1 − p22)...(p(κ−1)2)]
+R´1 · (1 − p12)(1 − p22)...(1− p(κ−1)2)
= ... = R´κ · (p1κ´)(p2κ´)...(p(κ−1)κ´) + ´Rκ−1 · [(1 − p1κ´)(p2κ´)...(p(κ−1)κ´)
+(p1κ´)(1 − p2κ´)...(p(κ−1)κ´) + (p11)(p21)...(1− p(κ−1)1)]
+... + R´2 · [(p1κ´)(1 − p2κ´)...(1 − p(κ−1)κ´)
+(1 − p1κ´)(p2κ´)...(1− p(κ−1)κ´) + ... +
(1 − p1κ´)(1 − p2κ´)...(p(κ−1)κ´)] +
R´1 · (1 − p1κ´)(1 − p2κ´)...(1 − p(κ−1)κ´) (35)
We will also have,
κ´∑
i=1
p ji = 1; ∀ j. (36)
Solving above set of equations i.e. (33,34,35,36), it turns
out that ∀ j, i; p ji =
1
κ´ . Applying similar logic as with
three player case we can see that it is optimal for every
player to randomize on κ rounds.
This kind of randomization is only possible if only
possible when whitewashing user whitewash in a coor-
dinated. Coordination is required because otherwise the
value of κ will remain unknown to whitewashing users.
If they whitewash in such a way, the whitewashing level
will be reduced κ times.
It is interesting to note that when all users randomize
over κ´ rounds, a node can unilaterally increase its pay-
off by decreasing the number of rounds, it is going to
randomize. It will get maximum pay-off when every
other node will randomize over κ´ rounds and it will
whitewash in every period. As every node is interested
in its own pay-off, every node will adapt the strategy to
whitewash in every round and hence all will get zero
pay-off as shown earlier and consequently they will be
discouraged for whitewashing.
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Fig. 4. Average Initial reputation offered to newcomer nodes
VI. Numerical Results
Performance evaluation of the proposed method to
avoid whitewash has been done for different kinds of
networks, viz. growing scale-free networks based on PA
model starting with 1000 nodes with growth rate of 0%
per 10 iteration, 2% per 10 iteration, 5% per 10 iteration,
8% per 10 iteration and regular network with 1000, 5000
and 10000 nodes. By growing network, we mean in such
a network after every 10 iterations some percentage of
new nodes join the network.
Fig. 5. Average Initial reputation offered to newcomer nodes
Fig. 6. Average Initial reputation offered to newcomer nodes
We have considered the discrete time instants for the
purpose of measurement and estimation in the simu-
lations. Every slot is termed as an iteration. Value of
Rini,i,max and Rini,i,min for all nodes has been taken as 0.5
and 0.03 respectively. Thus, 50% of the nodes are taken
to be potential whitewasher initially.
In the first iteration, all potential whitewasher nodes
attempt to whitewash to randomly chosen nodes. Every
node calculates the level of whitewash and according to
that it offers the initial reputation. Nodes, that attempt
10
(a)
(b)
Fig. 7. Change in Maximum whitewashing level
for whitewash, go for it as per their honesty level and
offered initial reputation. From next round onwards, po-
tential whitewashing nodes attempt for whitewash prob-
abilistically and the probability for attempting white-
wash for a node depends on the number of times that
node is able to whitewash, i.e.,
Pwa =
number o f times nodes was able to whiewash
total number o f times node attempted f or whitewash
.
(37)
Here Pwa is the probability by which a node will attempt
whitewash. This process is repeated again and again up
to 500 iteration.
Figure 4 and figure 6 present the fraction of nodes that
could whitewash in every iteration for growing scale-free
network and regular networks respectively. Figure 3 and
figure 5 present the average initial reputation offered by
nodes in every iteration for growing scale-free network
and regular networks respectively.
It is evident in figures that after some iterations, very
few nodes could whitewash in spite of a reasonable
initial reputation being offered to newcomer nodes. This
can also be observed from figures that proposed method
works for different kinds of networks. In figure 7, we
have plotted simultaneously, the fraction of users having
honesty level below NwN and initial reputation as function
of whitewashing level NwN . The intersection of these two
graphs gives the stable operating point.
Decreasing level of whitewash can be explained by
the fact that, as our algorithm periodically estimates
maximum whitewashing level, once system attains sta-
bility, the minimum reputation whitewashing level will
be reduced. This gives new stable operating point Y
(as shown in figure 7(b)) point. This process will be re-
peated again and again and over the time, the operating
point adjusted to keep the whitewashing level negligible
value.
VII. Conclusion
Whitewashing tendency of selfish users is a big prob-
lem in implementation of reputation management sys-
tem in peer-to-peer networks. In this paper, we have
proposed a method to avoid the problem of whitewash-
ing. This method adjusts initial reputation value as per
the level of whitewash. It is proved theoretically and by
simulation that the proposed method is able to avoid
whitewash .
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